Failure of Named Representatives in a Class Action to
Satisfy the Statute of Limitations
GordonM. Mead,Jr.t

Consider the following scenario: A named plaintiff files a class action suit on behalf of hundreds of tenants for breach of contract
against a large residential landlord. The complaint alleges that the

landlord has breached the terms of the lease by refusing to keep the
apartments in a decent state of repair.' The named representative has

clearly failed to file her individual complaint within the relevant twoyear statute of limitations, but the complaint describes a class com-

posed of some individuals who satisfy the statute of limitations and
others who fail the statute of limitations.
Can a district court consider the named representative's failure to
satisfy the statute of limitations at the certification stage of a class action suit? The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

prohibits district courts from considering time bars to the named representative's claim at certification. The Fourth Circuit reasons that

federal courts do not have the authority to consider a plaintiff's
chances of success on the merits at certification.2 Several district
courts, however, have considered the named representative's time bar

prior to certification. These courts reason that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 ("Rule 23") explicitly grants district courts the power to

evaluate all factual and legal claims relevant to certification.3
Under the approach suggested by the Fourth Circuit, a district
court must ignore the named representative's time bar at certification.

The district court grants certification and orders the class representative and attorney to send out notice to absent class members. The part

B.A. 1998, Dartmouth College; J.D. Candidate 2001,The University of Chicago.
Assume that a federal district court has jurisdiction because the parties are diverse. See
28 USC § 1332 (1993 & Supp 1999).
2
See InternationalWoodworkers of America v Chesapeake Bay Plywood Corp, 659 F2d
1259,1270 (4th Cir 1981) ("Courts passing upon motions for class certification have generally refused to consider the impact of such affirmative defenses as the statute of limitations on the potential representative's case."). See also Goodman v Schlesinger, 584 F2d 1325, 1332 (4th Cir
1978) (holding "that the district court acted prematurely in denying class certification"). See also
Part I.D.
3 See Commander Properties Corp v Beech Aircraft Corp, 164 FRD 529,538-39 (D Kan
1995) (deciding that the unique time bar prevented the representative from satisfying Rule
23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement); Sperling v Donovan, 104 FRD 4, 9 (D DC 1984) (declaring certification inappropriate and evaluating the named plaintiff's time bar under Rule
23(a)(3)'s typicality requirement). See also Part I.D.
1
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ties and the court then begin the costly and time-consuming discovery
process.
After certification, notice, and discovery, the defendant files a motion for summary judgment against the class representative on the basis of the statute of limitations defense. The district court predictably
grants summary judgment against the representative. At this point,'
courts and commentators can agree that the representative is unfit.
The delay, however, has created a Hobson's choice for the district
court: Either decertify the class or allow the substitution of a new representative.
If the district court decertifies, then the notice, discovery, and litigation costs to date are wasted. Automatically allowing substitution,
on the other hand, creates four problems: First, a representative's inadequate representation or atypical legal claims can often signal classwide internal difficulties that substitution cannot remedy. Second, certification itself will create pressure for a settlement that ignores differences between class members with timely and others with timebarred claims. 6 Third, routine substitution may deny the defendant
adequate notice of the type and scope of her liability before the statute of limitations has run. Fourth, automatic substitution reinforces
the incentives for class attorneys to name a single representative hastily. Multiple and diverse representatives would give the district court
better information about the individuals who constitute the class, facilitating more effective case management.!
This Comment proposes that federal district courts investigate a
named representative's time bar at certification. If the statute of limitations bars the named representative's claim, the district court should
only certify for clearly specified, compelling reasons. District courts
should also adopt a presumption towards striking the class complaint
when the statute of limitations bars the named representative's claims.
Part I explains the procedure for selecting named representatives
and certifying a class action. It details the sequence of events leading
to the district court's discovery of the named representative's time
bar. Part II describes how the time-barred representative can fail to
satisfy the requirements of Rule 23. Part III recommends evaluating

4 See, for example, Eisen v Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 US 156, 167 (1974) (describing substantial notice costs). See also Part II.A.2.
5 See Part II for a discussion of a time bar's implications for the named representative's
typicality and adequacy. See Part HI.A.2 for a discussion of the implications for the broader
class.
6 See Part uII.A.2.
7
See Part II.A.3.
8 See Part lII.B.1.
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these issues at certification and adopting a presumption towards
striking the class complaint if the district court refuses certification.
I. COMPETING APPROACHES TO THE FAILURE OF THE NAMED
REPRESENTATIVES TO SATISFY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Federal courts have approached the time-barred representative
differently, but some generally accepted principles about class actions
and statutes of limitations underlie their decisions. The class action
device combines the legal claims of many individual plaintiffs to conserve both judicial and litigant resources. Although aggregating these
claims can streamline justice and vindicate the legal claims of absent
class members, the class action device poses special due process problems. Rule 23 attempts to curb the potential for abuse by establishing
unique procedural safeguards for class action suits. As part of these
unique safeguards, certain class members must step forward and actively participate in the suit. 9 These class members, or named representatives, have the opportunity to supervise the class attorney actively."'
More importantly, named representatives provide the district court
with salient, prototypical, and concrete examples of class members.
The district court will usually consider Rule 23 requirements in a
special certification hearing. The certification hearing will determine
whether the action can be brought as a class action." Even after the
certification hearing, however, the district court retains the discretion
to limit the size of the class, force a clearer definition of the class, require the substitution of12 current representatives, or decertify and
strike the class complaint.
Time-barred representatives can fail to satisfy Rule 23 requirements. Courts disagree over whether a district court can consider the
timeliness of a representative's claim at certification. The Fourth Circuit, for instance, prohibits district courts from evaluating a representative's time bar at certification. The Fourth Circuit seeks to preserve
the independence of certification hearings: a certification hearing
should not become a truncated decision on the merits.13 Deciding the
9 For a general description of the origins of class action devices and the mechanism of
Rule 23, including its method for alleviating due process concerns, see John J. Cound, et al, Civil
Procedure:Cases and Materials682-88 (West 7th ed 1997). See also Part I.A.
10 See Part I.A.
11 FRCP 23(c)(1) (directing district courts to determine whether an action should be
brought as class action "[a]s soon as practicable"). See also Cound, et al, Civil Procedureat 69394 (cited in note 9). See also Part I.B.
12 FRCP 23(d) (describing the substantial managerial powers of the district court when
conducting a class action); Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Mary Kay Kane, 7B FederalPracticeand Procedure§ 1794 at 313 (West 2d ed 1998) (same). See also Part I.B.
13 See, for example, InternationalWoodworkers of America v Chesapeake Bay Plywood
Corp, 659 F2d 1259, 1270 (4th Cir 1981) (holding that "the district court acted prematurely in
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underlying validity of the claims too early will compromise the procedural safeguards of a full trial. Some district courts, however, emphasize resolving the fitness of the named representative "as soon as practical."'5 Delaying the resolution of issues critical to certification

threatens to compromise the efficiency goals of Rule 23. Delay may
have fairness implications as well. As a result, these district courts
evaluate statute of limitations defenses at certification. This Part describes the goals and operation of statute of limitations in the class ac-

tion device to help evaluate these competing claims.
A. The Named Representative's Role in a Federal Class Action
The federal class action enables large numbers of people to ag-

gregate similar claims, for either damages or injunctions, in a single
lawsuit." Hundreds and sometimes thousands of individual plaintiffs,
or class members, obviously cannot participate in the direction of the
suit in the same way that individual plaintiffs participate in a traditional lawsuit. Instead, the district court selects one or more individu-

als from the class to participate in the litigation and to protect the interests of other class members. These individuals, or named represen-

tatives, must satisfy several requirements outlined by Rule 23. '8
Most importantly, the named representatives must adequately
protect the interests of the class and present typical legal claims.'9 The
Due Process Clause requires the selection of named representatives

and class attorneys who will effectively guard the property interests of
absent class members. As the most involved class members, the
named representatives can more effectively influence the class attor-

denying class certification" when the class representative's complaint was time-barred). See also

Part LD.
14 See Eisen v Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 US 156, 178 (1974) ("[A] preliminary determination of the merits may result in substantial prejudice to a defendant, since of necessity it is not
accompanied by the traditional rules and procedures applicable to civil trials."). See also Part I.D
and Part llI.A.4.
15 FRCP 23(c)(1) (mandating a certification decision "[a]s soon as practicable"). See, for
example, Commander Properties Corp v Beech Aircraft Corp, 164 FRD 529,537 (D Kan 1995)
(considering the implications of a named representative's time bar for purposes of certification);
Sperling v Donovan, 104 FRD 4,9 (D DC 1984) (declaring time-barred representatives atypical
and refusing certification). See also Part I.D.
16 See Part Ill.A.2 and Part III.A.3.
17
Rule 23 enables the class to seek either damages or equitable relief This Comment will
focus on Rule 23(a)'s general requirements in the context of a suit for damages. When a class
seeks uniform equitable relief different issues may arise.
18 FRCP 23(a)-(b); Cound, et al, Civil Procedure at 689-93 (cited in note 9).
19 FRCP 23(a)(3) (typicality);FRCP 23(a)(4) (adequacy).
20
Phillips Petroleum Co v Shutts, 472 US 797, 812 (1985) ("[Tjhe Due Process Clause of
course requires that the named plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of the absent class members.").

2000]

Statute of Limitations

ney and participate in major litigation decisions.2 1 As the most salient
class members, the named representatives offer the district court concrete examples of the legal claims of the broader class.2 The named
representatives' disproportionate influence over the class attorney
and court require carefully aligning the interests of named representatives and absent class members.
In a large, complex class action suit, a single representative may
be unable to represent the spectrum of individual claims that compose
the class. Both Rule 23 and federal courts contemplate that several
named representatives, with slightly different legal or factual claims,
might represent the claims of the class more effectively.2 Consequently, larger and more diverse classes will often have multiple representatives.2

21 The Supreme Court has expressed concern when attorneys name representatives only
after determining the rough shape of the final settlement. Ortiz v FibreboardCorp, 527 US 815,
119 S Ct 2295,2319 n 31 (1999). The Fifth Circuit has also relied on the named representatives to
make decisions advancing the interests of the broader class. See Pettway v American Cast Iron
Pipe Co, 576 F2d 1157,1177-78 (5th Cir 1978) (deciding that the initial decision to appeal should
presumptively rest with the class representatives, although the class attorney should be able to
bring arguments before the court that might protect the interest of absent class members). Some
academics have criticized the vision of the named representative as active monitor. The named
representative has a small stake in the outcome, is usually chosen by the attorney, and the attorney avoids named representatives that will exert significant control. See Jonathan R. Macey and
Geoffrey P.Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U Chi L Rev 1, 41 (1991). The named representative is unlikely to complain about a class attorney's conduct. Thus, when the named representative actually does complain, perhaps courts should pay close attention. Id at 42-43. Because
the named representative has a limited incentive to monitor actively, a complaint from the representative signals particularly egregious behavior by a class attorney. The named representative's
monitoring role could be seen as a supplemental safeguard embedded in Rule 23.
22 Even harsh critics of the named representative device admit that a review of "exemplary
class members" is necessary for the district court to make decisions about personal jurisdiction,
standing, and administrative requirements. Jean Wegman Bums, Decorative Figureheads:Eliminating Class Representatives in ClassActions,42 Hastings L J 165,194-95 (1990).
23 The text of Rule 23(a) references the possibility that multiple individuals may serve as
class representatives. FRCP 23(a) ("One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties" if they satisfy the general requirements of Rule 23(a)). The Supreme Court
has long noted that a single representative might fail to represent adequately the interests of a
class when multiple representatives could adequately represent those interests. General Telephone Co of the Southwest v Falcon,457 US 147, 157-60 (1982) (noting a wide divergence between the single named representative's claim of discriminatory denial of promotion and some
class members' claims of discriminatory hiring practices). The Supreme Court more recently
noted that when substantial factual differences between members of the class exist, the district
court should create subclasses and name separate plaintiffs to represent each subclass. Amchem
Product4 Inc v Windsor, 521 US 591, 626-27 (1997) (noting the failure of the district court to
create subclasses and address factual difficulties).
24 See, for example, In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,Inc, 51 F3d 1293, 1296-97 (7th Cir 1995)
(describing a class action on behalf of all hemophiliacs in the United States infected with H1V
from the blood supply as represented by multiple named representatives).
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Selection of Named Representatives and the Certification of
the Class

The plaintiffs' attorney generally recommends one or more
named representatives to the district court.' As soon as practical, the
district court holds a certification hearing to determine the fitness of
the named representatives.2 At the certification hearing, the district
court has three options. First, a district court can grant certification if
the named representative clearly satisfies Rule 23 requirements.V Second, a district court can grant conditional certification if it lacks the
evidence to refuse certification but fears that fuller discovery or subsequent events will reveal the named representatives' unfitness.f
Third, the district court can refuse certification if the named representatives clearly fail to satisfy Rule 23 requirements. Upon refusing
certification, the district court can either dismiss the class complaint or
order remedial steps. Remedial steps might include limiting the size of
the class, forcing the plaintiffs' attorney to more clearly define the
scope of the class complaint, or allowing the substitution of other class
members as named representatives.29 If the district court orders remedial steps, the district court will almost certainly grant certification after the plaintiffs' attorney has complied with its order." After the district court grants certification, the plaintiffs' attorney will send notice
of the action to absent class members, and full discovery will begin as
the parties proceed to trial.
C. The Purpose and Operation of Statutes of Limitations
Statutes of limitations require plaintiffs to file suit within a specified period of time after the defendant's wrongful conduct. If the
plaintiffs fail to file suit within that time period, courts refuse to consider the underlying validity of the cause of action.31 Statutes of limitations prevent the deterioration of evidence, facilitate fairness to de-

25
26
27
2

Cound, et al, Civil Procedureat 688 (cited in note 9).
See note 11.
FRCP 23(c)-(d); Cound, et a, Civil Procedureat 693-94 (cited in note 9).
FRCP 23(c)(1) (describing the certification order as conditional and subject to amend-

ment at any time before a decision on the merits); General Telephone Co of the Southwest v Falcon, 457 US 147,160 (1982) ("Even after a certification order is entered, the judge remains free
to modify it in the light of subsequent developments in the litigation.").
29
30
31

See notes 130-33.
FRCP 23(c)-(d); Cound, et al, Civil Procedureat 693-94 (cited in note 9).
Order of Railroad Telegraphers v Railway Express Agency, 321 US 342, 348-49 (1944)

(describing the operation and purpose of statutes of limitations). For a general discussion of
statutes of limitations, see Tyler T. Ochoa and Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposesof Statutes of Limitations,28 Pac L J 453 (1997).
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fendants,n punish plaintiffs for sleeping on their rights,33 and reduce
the strain on the judicial system.m
Statutes of limitations are usually procedural. They prescribe a
period of time during which the plaintiff may bring suit without setting any limits on the existence of the legal right itself;5 Procedural
statutes of limitations are both waivable and subject to traditional equitable exceptions.! Sometimes, however, statutes of limitations may
circumscribe the right itself Substantive or jurisdictional statutes of
limitations are sometimes termed statutes of repose. Time limits on
state wrongful death statutes are often characterized as time limits
upon the actual substantive right. States have enacted statutes of repose designed to shield manufacturers from product liability suits a
certain number of years after the product has been marketed, regardless of when the injury occurred. These statutes are often considered
limitations on the right itself.
D. The Failure of Named Representatives to Satisfy the Statute
of Limitations
Because class actions involve the aggregation of many individual
claims over time, statutes of limitations will often bar the claims of
some class members while permitting the claims of other class members.!9 Frequently, named representatives fail to satisfy the statute of
32 United States v Kubrick, 444 US 111, 117 (1979) (emphasizing fairness to the defendant
and preservation of evidence); Order of Railroad Telegraphers, 321 US at 348-49 (emphasizing
the importance of preventing surprise, preserving evidence, and placing the defendant on notice).
33 American Pipe & Construction Co v Utah, 414 US 538, 554-55 (1974) (recognizing the
need to punish plaintiffs who have slept on their rights).
34 Burnett v New York CentralRailroad Co, 380 US 424,428 (1965) ("[T]he courts ought to
be relieved of the burden of trying stale claims when a plaintiff has slept on his rights.").
35 Zipes v Trans World Airlines Inc, 455 US 385,398 (1982) (describing the time limits embodied in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act as procedural rather than jurisdictional and
subject to equitable exceptions); Cedars-SinaiMedical Center v Shalala, 125 F3d 765,770-71 (9th
Cir 1997) (holding that a statute must explicitly describe the time limit as jurisdictional in order
for it to be jurisdictional).
36 Zipes, 455 US at 398. Many jurisdictions will toll the statute of limitations if the defendant is absent from a jurisdiction during the statutory period or fraudulently conceals the tortious wrong. Many jurisdictions will also toll the statute of limitations if the plaintiff suffers from
a personal disability or incapacity to sue, such as infancy or mental incapacity. For a description
of traditional equitable exceptions, see Geoffrey C Hazard, Jr., Colin C. Tait, and William A.
Fletcher, Pleadingand Procedure:State and FederalCases and Materials132-33 (Foundation 8th
ed 1999).
37 Symeon C. Symeonides, Wendy Collins Perdue, and Arthur T.von Mehren, Conflict of
Laws: American, Comparative,International:Cases and Materials 374 (West 1998).
38 See, for example, Love v Whirlpool Corp, 449 SE2d 602,606-07 (Ga 1994) (characterizing Georgia's products liability statute of repose as a limitation on the scope of the right itself).
39
See, for example, NationalAssn of Govt Employees v City Pub Serv Bd of San Antonio,
40 F3d 698,716 (5th Cir 1994) (stating in the context of a Title VII class action that "[p]utative
class members whose grievances are barred by the statute of limitations ... cannot be counted
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limitations and their claims are therefore time-barred. 4 Sometimes, all
of the named representatives fail to satisfy the statute of limitations.
Courts and commentators disagree over whether to consider time bars
to the named representative's action at the certification hearing. Some
courts evaluate time bars to the named representative's action at certification. These courts carefully consider whether the time bar will

render the named representative inadequate or her legal claims atypical. If the district court concludes that the time bar does not com-

promise the named representative's ability to represent the class, then
the court can certify or conditionally certify the class action.43 If the
court concludes that the time bar renders the named representative
unfit, then the district court can either allow substitution or intervention by a class member who satisfies the statute of limitations, limit the
size of the class, or strike the class complaint.Other courts refuse to consider the named representative's failure to satisfy the statute of limitations at certification.4' These courts

toward computation of the class").
40 This Comment focuses on cases where all of the representatives fail to satisfy the statute
of limitations. As long as a single remaining representative satisfies the statute of limitations, the
district court will probably allow the action to continue. Aguirre v Bustos, 89 FRD 645, 648 (D
NM 1981) (severing one named plaintiff because of inadequacy and allowing the others to remain); Wright, Miller, and Kane, 7A FederalPracticeand Procedure§ 1765 at 277-78 n 34 (cited
in note 12) (noting that there is "[o]nly one representative needed").
41
See, for example, Davis v Bethlehem Steel Corp, 600 F Supp 1312,1322-23 (D Md 1985)
(noting that all four named representatives failed to satisfy the statute of limitations).
42 See, for example, Commander PropertiesCorp v Beech Aircraft Corp, 164 FRD 529,537
(D Kan 1995) (considering the impact of the representative's time bar on Rule 23 requirements);
Sperling v Donovan,104 FRD 4,9 (D DC 1984) (declaring time-barred representatives atypical
and refusing certification).
43
See, for example, Rodger v Electronic Data Systems Corp, 160 FRD 532, 538-39 (E D
NC 1995) (certifying a class action after finding that statute of limitations defenses specific to
named representatives did not render them atypical).
44 See, for example, International Woodworkers of America v Chesapeake Bay Plywood
Corp, 659 F2d 1259,1270 (4th Cir 1981) (reversing the district court's dismissal of class complaint
to allow substitution by non-time-barred class members). See also Cound, et al, Civil Procedure
at 694-95 (cited in note 9) (describing the options of the district court after a denial of certification).
45 International Woodworkers, 659 F2d at 1270 (admitting that disqualifying the named
representative after summary judgment would be appropriate, but refusing to allow the district
court to consider the issue at certification); In re VMS SecuritiesLitigation,136 FRD 466,477 (N
D Ill 1991) ("'mally, inasmuch as the statute of limitations defense addresses the merits of plaintiffs' claims, it is beyond the scope of a motion for class certification."); In re Baldwin-United
Corp Litigation,122 FRD 424,427 (S D NY 1986) (ruling that individual questions of timeliness
should not be decided at the certification stage); Dameronv Sinai Hospital of Baltimore Inc, 595
F Supp 1404, 1408-09 (D Md 1984) (classifying the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense that should not be considered prior to certification); Herbert Newberg, 3 Newberg on Class
Actions § 3.16 at 93 (Shepard's 1992) ("[T]he class representative need not show a probability of
individual success on the merits."). See also Goodman v Schlesinger,584 F2d 1325,1332 (4th Cir
1978) (deciding that the district court acted prematurely in denying certification to the entire
class when it disqualified the three named plaintiffs).
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rely on the Supreme Court's decision in Eisen v Carlisle & Jacquelin"
for the proposition that district courts should not evaluate the plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits at certification.4 7 In Eisen, the
district court held a preliminary hearing on the merits of the plaintiffs'

claims, and, after determining that the plaintiff was "more than likely"
to prevail on the merits, forced the defendants to bear 90 percent of
the notice costs. The Supreme Court reversed the imposition of notice
costs, remarking that nothing in Rule 23 gives the district court the
authority to conduct a hearing on the merits. The Supreme Court worried that allowing such a procedure would defeat the purpose of the

Rule 23 requirements by allowing the named representative to obtain
the advantages of a class action before satisfying Rule 23's requirements for representation. The Supreme Court also expressed concern
that a preliminary trial on the merits would deprive the defendant of
the procedural and evidentiary safeguards applicable only to a full
trial.
Courts concerned about the Eisen restriction on evaluating the
merits of the claim before certification defer statute of limitations issues until the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment. 9 If the
court grants summary judgment against the named representatives
prior to trial, then the court must resolve the status of the class action.n At this point, the court can allow substitution by other class
members, limit the size of the class, or decertify the class.
46

47
48

417 US 156 (1974).
Id at 177-78.

Id.

The Second Circuit and the Sixth Circuit have allowed district courts to decide motions
for summary judgment against named representatives before the certification hearing. See
Schweizer v Trans Union Corp, 136 F3d 233,239 (2d Cir 1998) ("The decision to award summary
judgment before acting on class certification was well within the discretion of the district
court.");Jibsonv Michigan Education Association-NEA,30 F3d 723,734 (6th Cir 1994) (allowing
the district court to resolve a single issue in the case at summary judgment before addressing the
issue of certification). A district court might be able to use this device to dismiss a time-barred
named representative before certification, but it has several limitations. First, some courts refuse
to allow it. See Peritz v Liberty Loan Corp, 523 F2d 349, 353-55 (7th Cir 1975) (declaring the
procedure violative of Eisen's prohibition against evaluating claims on the merits at certification). Second, a motion for summary judgment against the named representative alone will not
resolve any of the issues relating to the class. See Smith v Shawnee Library System, 60 F3d 317,
322 (7th Cir 1995) (refusing to grant class-wide effects to summary judgment against named representative because lack of effective certification voided initial certification decision). Both the
plaintiff and defendant may desire to resolve the issues in the context of the certification decision. Part II suggests that the named representative's time bar will often interact with Rule 23 in
complex ways, and the defendant may be reluctant to divorce those inquiries. Finally, a defendant
may be reluctant to bring a motion for summary judgment against a single individual very early
in the litigation, before full discovery, because she wishes to bring the motion on other grounds
in the alternative.
5
The Fourth Circuit has disqualified representatives after granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment but refused to grant district courts the power to determine those issues at certification. See, for example, InternationalWoodworkers,659 F2d at 1270.
49
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II. A TIME BAR TO THE NAMED REPRESENTATIVES' ACTION CAN
CREATE SUBSTANTIAL PROBLEMS UNDER RULE 23(A)

The failure of all of the named representatives in a class action to
satisfy the statute of limitations can create several difficulties under
Rule 23. Rule 23(a) describes the general requirements for the maintenance of a class action.5 ' A time bar to the named representatives'
action may create three problems under the general Rule 23(a) requirements.
First, Rule 23(a) implicitly requires that the class representative
be a member of the class. If the named representative's claims are
time-barred, she may cease to be a member of the class. 2 Second, Rule

23(a)(3) requires that the representative's legal claims be typical of
class members' legal claims. In some cases, the named representative's
vulnerability to a statute of limitations defense may make her legal
claims markedly different from those of absent class members.5 3 Third,
Rule 23(a)(4) requires that a representative fairly and adequately pro-

tect the interests of the class. A time-barred representative will usually
lack the incentives to vigorously protect the interests of the class. The
failure of the named representative to satisfy the statute of limitations
might also create conflicts of interest between the named representative and absent class members.5 Thus, the failure of the named representative to satisfy the statute of limitations may raise substantial

problems with Rule 23(a)'s general requirements for the maintenance
of a class action."

FRCP 23(a).
See Part Il.A.
See Part II.B.
54 See Part II.C.
55 The district court must also sort the class action into one of three categories outlined in
Rule 23(b). The district court may label the action a Rule 23(b)(3) mass tort class action, where
the only unifying feature is that the defendant has injured all of the class members in the same
way. Rule 23(b)(3) has two more stringent requirements: First, questions of law or fact common
to the class members must predominate over questions affecting individual class members. Second, the district court must find that the "class action is superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." FRCP 23(b)(3). If the representative cannot satisfy the general requirements of 23(a), the representative will obviously not satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). More interestingly, district courts have used the requirements of
Rule 23(b)(3) to deny certification despite finding that the named representatives satisfied the
more general requirements of Rule 23(a). These courts raised the same arguments used in the
adequacy and typicality context, but they concluded that in the individual case they create lesser
problems that only rise to the level of compromising predominance and superiority. See, for example, Harding v TambrandsInc, 165 FRD 623, 629-30 (D Kan 1996) (illustrating that in a case
of ongoing or continuous harm the representative's time bar may be more likely to coincide with
difficult choice of law problems that undermine superiority).
51
52
53
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A. Class Membership
A time bar may prevent a plaintiff from being a member of the
class, making her unfit to serve as the sole named representative. The
Supreme Court has ruled that "a class representative must be part of
the class and 'possess the same interest and suffer the same injury' as
the class members."" The interests of absent class members must be
"fairly encompassed within the named plaintiff's claim," and the district court should examine the pleadings, evidence introduced for certification, and evidence uncovered during discovery to determine the
representative's class membership."
Courts that have addressed the issue unanimously agree that a
time-barred named representative is not "part of the class.'" The functional justifications underlying the class membership requirement
provide a persuasive reason to refuse certification. The named representative's time bar deprives her of any interest in the outcome of the
litigation; her interests fundamentally diverge from the interests of absent class members with timely claims." The courts cannot trust a
named representative without a vested interest in the outcome of the
litigation to monitor the plaintiffs' attorney actively or to provide a
realistic example of the class's legal claims to the district court.0 The
Fourth Circuit and Eighth Circuit properly decided that a named representative who fails to satisfy the statute of limitations is not a member of the class.
The class membership requirement is closely related to Rule 23's
other requirements. The Supreme Court reasoned that the named representative's lack of class membership raises problems of commonality, typicality, and adequacy.' By looking to the named representative's
class membership, the district court can more easily determine
56 East Texas Motor FreightSystem, Inc v Rodriguez,431 US 395,403 (1977), quoting Schlesinger v Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 US 208,216 (1974). For a general discussion,

see Wright, Miller, and Kane, 7A FederalPracticeand Procedure§ 1761 at 132-50 (cited in note
12).
57 General Telephone Co of the Southwest v Falcon,457 US 147, 160 (1982).
58 See GreatRivers Cooperativev FarmlandIndustrie Inc, 120 F3d 893,899 (8th Cir 1997)
(refusing to certify a class when the named plaintiff clearly had inquiry notice and thus was timebarred); Weinberger v Retail Credit Co, 498 F2d 552, 556 (4th Cir 1974) (refusing to allow the
time-barred named plaintiff to serve as class representative); Mason v Anheuser-Busch, Inc, 579
F Supp 871,873 n 1 (E D Mo 1984) ("[P]laintiff is precluded from being a member of such a class
because his action is time-barred.").
59 See notes 72-73.
60 See notes 21-22.
61 Falcon,457 US at 157-58 & n 13 (noting the interrelatedness of commonality, typicality,
and adequacy requirements); East Texas Motor Freight,431 US at 405-06 ("The mere fact that a
complaint alleges racial or ethnic discrimination does not in itself ensure that the party who has
brought the lawsuit will be an adequate representative of those who may have been the real victims of that discrimination.").
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"whether under the particular circumstances maintenance of a class
action is economical and whether the named plaintiff's claim and the
class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members
will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence."'2

B.

Typicality
In some cases, the availability of a statute of limitations defense

will render the time-barred plaintiff's legal claims atypical. Rule
23(a)(3) requires that "the claims or defenses of the representative
parties" be "typical of the claims or defenses of the class." Usually, the
plaintiff is deemed to have satisfied Rule 23(a)(3) if the claims or de-

fenses of the representatives and class members either stem from the
same event or propose the same legal or remedial theory. Under this
view, Rule 23(a)(3) is used to screen out class actions where the legal

or factual position of the representative is markedly different from
that of other members of the class despite the existence of common issues of law or fact.A
Federal courts are divided over whether a district court should

deny certification on typicality grounds when a named representative
fails to satisfy a procedural statute of limitations. Some courts have
reasoned that a named representative with a defense unique to her is

not an appropriate class representative.6' Other courts have decided

that statute of limitations problems may create management difficul-

ties, but these management difficulties do not rise to the level of defeating typicality.6
Falcon,457 US at 157 n 13.
See Hilao v Estate of Marcos, 103 F3d 767,774 (9th Cir 1996) (certifying a class of alleged victims of torture because all claims rested on the theory that the former president was responsible for the torture, allowing the district court to resolve all individual statute of limitations
questions in a single, legal determination); Consolidated Rail Corp v Hyde Park,47 F3d 473,483
(2d Cir 1995) (finding that the defense of the named representative was typical of class defenses
when "[e]ach member of the defendant class participate[d] in New York's system of taxation");
Baby Nealfor and by Kanterv Casey, 43 F3d 48,58 (3d Cir 1994) (finding that named representatives could allege systematic failure of child care services on behalf of the class despite the fact
that services required by law depended on the status of each individual child).
64 See Hill v Western Electric Co, Inc, 596 F2d 99,101-02 (4th Cir 1979) (holding that the
interest of named plaintiffs in being free of discrimination in promotion and job assignments was
so different from class members' interest in avoiding discriminatory hiring as to render named
plaintiffs atypical).
65 See Hardy v City Optical Inc, 39 F3d 765,770 (7th Cir 1994) (acknowledging that a legal
defense unique to the named representative could make her atypical); Sperling v Donovan, 104
FRD 4, 9 (D DC 1984) (ruling that time bar to named representatives' action rendered them
atypical).
66 Wagnerv Nutrasweet Co, 95 F3d 527,534 (7th Cir 1996) (referring to the defendant's actions rather than statute of limitations defenses against class members to determine typicality);
Hardingv TambrandsInc,165 FRD 623,628-29 (D Kan 1996) (deciding that differing statutes of
limitations did not rise to the level of defeating typicality); Commander PropertiesCorp v Beech
Aircraft Corp, 164 FRD 529,537 (D Kan 1995) (classifying the statute of limitations concern as
62
63
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District courts seem particularly likely to declare the time-barred
named representative atypical in two circumstances. First, if the
named representative is only one of a few members of the class who
suffers from the statute of limitations defect, then the district court
will be more willing to declare her atypical.f Second, if the district
court suspects that individualized limitations defenses will dominate
the litigation, the district court will be more willing to declare the representative atypical.6 Although these decisions will be highly factspecific, a time bar to the named representative's action can create
typicality problems.
C.

Adequacy

A time bar may prevent a plaintiff from adequately guarding the
interests of other class members. Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the representative "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."6 9
The adequacy requirement prohibits named representatives from
maintaining an action when the interests of the named representative
diverge from the interests of class members.
The failure of the named representative to satisfy the statute of
limitations might compromise adequacy in two ways: First, a time bar
might deprive the named representative of a stake in the outcome of
the litigation, eliminating her individual incentive to protect the interests of the class. Courts commonly require that, at the time of certification, the named representative have an incentive to prosecute the

tangential if the same legal theory underlies the larger case).
67
See Koos v First NationalBank of Peoria,496 F2d 1162,1164 (7th Cir 1974) ("Where it
is predictable that a major focus of the litigation will be on an arguable defense unique to the
named plaintiff... then the named plaintiff is not a proper class representative."); Rodger v
Electronic Data Systems Corp, 160 FRD 532,538-39 (E D NC 1995) (ruling that unique defense
must make the named representative markedly different from those of the class). See also Sperling, 104 FRD at 9-10 (noting that named plaintiffs who failed to satisfy the statute of limitations
would not be appropriate representatives of class members who satisfied the statute of limitations).
68 Compare Hilao,103 F3d at 774 (finding that there were no "relevant individual statuteof-limitations issues" and upholding district court decision to certify class), with Gary Plastic
Packaging Corp v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc, 903 F2d 176, 180 (2d Cir 1990)
(noting that if the unique defense has the potential to dominate the litigation, typicality may not
be satisfied).
69 FRCP23(a)(4).
70 Amchem ProductS Inc v Windsor,521 US 591,625 (1997) ("The adequacy inquiry under
Rule 23(a)(4) serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they
seek to represent."); General Telephone Co of the Southwest v Falcon,457 US 147, 157-58 n 13
(1982) (noting the adequacy of representation requirement's concerns about conflicts of interest).
71
This assumes that the representative's primary interest in the litigation is an individual
claim for damages. As noted earlier, representatives seeking injunctive relief may present a different case.
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class action vigorously For example, the Seventh Circuit refused to
certify a class action when the two named representatives had settled
their individual claims against the defendant."
Second, a named representative might be more likely to fail to

satisfy the statute of limitations in a case of ongoing or continuous
harm.4 For example, it may be more difficult to determine when the

action accrued in a case of ongoing pollution or sexual harassment. In
such situations, the failure of the named representative to satisfy the
statute of limitations might signal conflicts between the interests of
the named representative and the class members. Courts have commonly found conflicts between current and future victims that rise to

the level of compromising adequacy.75

Third, when the district court sits in diversity, differing statutes of

limitations may create a conflict among putative class members.76 In
many cases, the class representative and her attorney can select the

relevant statute of limitations by selecting the forum. District courts
sitting in diversity will apply the choice of law rules of the state in
which they sit, and choice of law rules will determine the relevant substantive law.n State choice of law rules generally dictate that the forum
state's statute of limitations will apply. 8 The named representative
72 See Bennett v Westfall, 640 F Supp 169,170 (SD W Va 1986), affd 836 F2d 1342 (4th Cir
1988) (holding that a prisoner transferred out of jail was not a proper class representative to
bring an action on behalf of inmates based upon conditions in the jail).
73 Davis v Ball Memorial Hospital Association, Inc, 753 F2d 1410, 1418 (7th Cir 1985)
(finding that named plaintiffs "have received all of the relief they sought" against the defendant
and "lack a personal stake in the outcome").
74 Class actions often consolidate the claims of those who have suffered from continuous
or ongoing activity. Hilao v Estate of Marcos, 103 F3d 767,771 (9th Cir 1996) (aggregating the
claims of those tortured over the course of fourteen years); NationalAssn of Govt Employees v
City Pub Serv Bd of San Antonio, 40 F3d 698,702 (5th Cir 1994) (collecting discrimination claims
under Title VII); Harding v Tambrands Inc, 165 FRD 623, 626 (D Kan 1996) (combining the
claims of toxic shock syndrome sufferers over the course of ten years).
75
Ortiz v FibreboardCorp, 527 US 815, 119 S Ct 2295,2319-20 (1999) (emphasizing that
the district court should not certify a class containing present and future victims of asbestosrelated diseases without creating subclasses with individual representation); Amchem, 521 US at
626-27 (noting that the different interests between those injured in the distant past and those yet
to become symptomatic required division into subclasses); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc, 51
F3d 1293, 1296-97 (7th Cir 1995) (noting that a district court refused to certify a single class of
hemophiliacs infected from the blood supply because of differing dates of infection).
76 See Harding,165 FRD at 628-29 (D Kan 1996) (noting the potential conflict caused by
the selection of a statute of limitations but deciding that it did not rise to the level necessary to
defeat adequacy).
77 Klaxon Co v Stentor ElectricManufacturing Co, Inc,313 US 487,496 (1941) (ruling that
a federal court sitting in diversity must apply state choice of law rules); Erie Railroad Co v
Tompkins, 304 US 64,78-79 (1938) (ruling that a federal court sitting in diversity must apply
state substantive law).
78 See, for example, Keeton v Hustler Magazine, Inc, 549 A2d 1187, 1191-92 (NH 1988)
(ruling that even under an interest analysis regime, the forum would apply its statute of limitations). See also Symeonides, Perdue, and von Mehren, Conflict of Laws at 371-78 (cited in note
37) (noting that under both the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws and the Restatement
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might choose a particular forum simply because its statute of limitations allows her to maintain her individual action, despite the fact that
the forum would apply less favorable substantive law. The choice of
substantive law might prejudice class members who could satisfy either state's statute of limitations. The named representative's choice of
a forum may create subtle conflicts that would not be readily apparent
when the absent member makes the decision to join or abstain from
the class." These subtle choice of law problems may create conflicts
between the class representative and class members that require judicial attention.
D. Application of Rule 23 by District Courts
Although Rule 23 establishes several analytically distinct requirements for certification, the United States Supreme Court has
admitted that these inquiries tend to collapse upon one anotherO District courts analyze the time-barred named representative under various Rule 23 labels and often justify a refusal to certify, in the alternative, under several Rule 23 requirements. District courts presented
with large, complex class actions also often fail to attend carefully to
"peripheral" statute of limitations issues. The following two cases illustrate that a district court's pragmatic application of Rule 23 can deviate substantially from the idealized approach presented in Parts
II.A-C.
In Commander Properties Corporationv Beech Aircraft Corpo-

rationSl an airplane owner ("Commander") brought an action against
an airplane manufacturer ("Beech") for a wing joint problem. Commander sought certification for a class of all owners of certain Beech
airplanes during the relevant time period.8

(Second) of Conflict of Laws the district court will generally apply the forum's statute of limita-

tions).
79 Arthur Miller and David Crump have made a similar argument. Miller and Crump worried that a class attorney's choice of forum might entail a substantive body of state law that favored some members of the class at the expense of others. Although the authors concluded that
these conflicts would be too subtle and "ethereal" for consideration by most district courts,

Miller and Crump argued that the existence of potential conflicts militated against the personal

jurisdiction and choice of law principles outlined in Shutts. Arthur R. Miller and David Crump,
Jurisdictionand Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions after Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,

96 Yale L J 1,66-67 (1986).
80 See Amchem Products,Inc v Windsor, 521 US 591,623 n 18 (1997) (noting the similarities between Rule 23(a)(3)'s commonality requirement and Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement); General Telephone Co of the Southwest v Falcon,457 US 147, 157 n 13 (1982) (acknowledging that Rule 23's typicality, commonality, and adequacy requirements "tend to
merge").
81 164 FRD 529 (D Kan 1995).
82

Id at 533.
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The district court initially acknowledged it could not "delve into
the merits of the action," but the court proceeded to qualify that
statement by saying the court must analyze the claims and defenses of
the parties carefully. The court analyzed typicality and adequacy under a single subheading. The court noted that typicality did not impose
a requirement that the legal claims be identical. After setting forth this
uncontroversial legal proposition, the district court described the typicality requirement as "dovetail[ing]" with the adequacy requirement.8Y
Beech argued that a statute of limitations defense unique to
Commander should render him atypical. Commander arguably had
actual notice of the wrong and injury before the other members of the
class, and Commander's action was arguably barred by the statute of
limitations. The district court refused to reach the question of typicality.
Instead, the district court held that the class action failed to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)'s more specific and stringent requirement that
questions of law or fact common to the class members must predominate over questions affecting individual class members. The district
court ruled that "individual questions of law predominate with respect
to ... statute of limitations defenses."5 The Commander court stated
that individual questions of fact would also determine the outcome of
the tolling claims and refused to certify the action as a 23(b)(3) class
action. '
In Sperling v Donovan,5 the district court treated the time-barred
nature of the representative's claims casually, but its treatment of the
issue critically affected the disposition of the case."' In Sperling, the
district court refused to certify a class action by two white named
plaintiffs who alleged the, Department of Labor had engaged in reverse discrimination.5 The district court emphasized that the isolated
nature of the plaintiff's complaints made them markedly different or
atypical from the remainder of the class." In reaching this decision,
however, the district court refused to consider the named representative's time-barred claims.3 The district court naturally assumed it
should consider the effects of a time bar when passing on typicality.9 3

83

Id at 534.

84 Id at 535 ("Atypical claims potentially create antagonistic interests, which will presumably affect Commander's ability to adequately represent the class.").
85 Id at 536-37.
86 Id at 538.
87 Id at 538-39.
88 104 FRD 4 (D DC 1984).
89 Id at 9.
90 Id at 5-6,9.
91 Id at 7-9.
92 Id at 5 ("The question for the court is whether a class may be certified where, although a
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These district court cases portray the application of Rule 23 in
practice. District courts consider multiple features of an action that
could disqualify it for class treatment under multiple Rule 23 labels.
District courts sometimes conflate analytic categories and attempt to
avoid reaching the most difficult issues. These features of low-level
decisionmaking make it difficult to distill the importance of deciding
individual legal issues under clear analytic labels. Although this Comment's proposal would have generated the same outcome the district
courts reached in these cases, class membership, typicality and adequacy each provide independent reasons for deciding how timebarred representatives should be treated.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD CONSIDER TIME BARS
AT CERTIFICATION AND ACT DECISIVELY
IN THE FACE OF RULE 23 PROBLEMS

Assuming that the named representative's time bar can create
substantial problems under Rule 23, why would district courts not
consider those problems at certification? District courts, at least initially, consider most other issues that have Rule 23 implications at certification. Certain advantages, such as judicial economy, fairness to absent class members, and fairness to the defendant flow naturally from
applying the same decisionmaking schedule to the time-barred representative. Although district courts cannot investigate the representative's chances of success on the merits at the certification stage, a
mandatory, but narrowly tailored, Rule 23 inquiry at certification
could weed out some cases in which the named representative's claim
is time-barred. Part III.A explores the advantages of applying the requirements of Rule 23 at certification.
If a district court decides the named representative does not satisfy Rule 23 requirements at certification, the district court can allow
substitution, redefine the class, limit the size of the class, or strike the
class complaint. " Courtschoosing between striking the class complaint
or ordering the plaintiffs' attorney to name a new representative frequently allow the plaintiffs' attorney to name another representative.n
Allowing substitution reinforces existing incentives for plaintiffs' attorneys to name few representatives and creates management difficulties for the district court. Part III.B details automatic substitution's
dynamic, deleterious effects. This Comment then proposes that district
potential class can be identified, most of the individual plaintiff's claims are time-barred and
cannot be revived under a continuing violation theory.").
93 Id at 9 (noting that "[m]ost of plaintiffs' claims in the case at bar are not timely" and
moving on to examine only the timely claims to establish the atypicality of the representatives).
94 See notes 130-34.
95 See text accompanying note 136.
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courts adopt a meaningful presumption towards striking the class
complaints to create incentives for plaintiffs' attorneys to name multiple and diverse representatives.
A. District Courts Should Consider Tme Bars to the Named
Representative at Certification
If the district court can accurately decide some statute of limitations issues at certification, it will create considerable advantages for
the judicial system and litigants. This Part proposes that the district
court decide "easy cases" and identify "hard cases" at the certification
stage."'
Resolving the statute of limitations issue before certification has
two advantages. First, a district court that discovers that a representative fails to satisfy the statute of limitations after discovery and crossmotions for summary judgment faces an unpalatable choice. The district court can decertify and waste the substantial resources expended
in discovery, or the district court can allow substitution and risk unfairness to absent class members. Considering the issue before certification allows the district court to dismiss unfit named representatives
before the parties or the court have invested heavily in the litigation.7
Second, time-barred representatives may not give the defendant effective notice of the scope and type of her liability within the statutory
period. In the class action context, the Supreme Court has relied
heavily on the named representative to justify tolling the statute of
limitations for all class members. District courts that take the purposes
of statutes of limitations seriously should consider these issues early
and usually refuse substitution.n
Finally, Rule 23 grants the district court sufficient authority to
consider some statute of limitations questions at certification.9 As explained in Part II, a representative's time bar directly bears on Rule 23
requirements. District courts have both the authority and competence
to evaluate a named representative's time bar at certification.
1. Courts can accurately decide easy cases at certification.
District courts can resolve certain statute of limitations issues accurately at certification-the easy cases. A district court will find it difficult to decide other statute of limitations issues-the hard cases.
When thinking about the relative prevalence of easy and hard statute
of limitations questions, it might be useful to think along two dimen96

97

98
99

Part III.A.1 describes the distinction between easy and hard cases.
See Part III.A.2.
See Part III.A.3.
See Part III.A.4.

2000]

Statute of Limitations

sions. First, a statute of limitations issue might be either shared or individual. A district court's determination could either affect large
groups of class members similarly (shared) or each individual class
member differently (individual). Second, a shared statute of limitations issue might be legal or factual."O
Shared, legal statute of limitations issues will be easy for a district
court to resolve at certification. For example, the parties may disagree
about characterizing the cause of action as arising in contract or in
tort, and the characterization will select the relevant statute of limitations. The characterization issue is a legal question that will critically
affect the resolution of the statute of limitations defense for many
class members."' Additional discovery will not help a district court resolve the issue. District courts should decide this issue at certification.
Similarly, shared, factual cases might be easy for district courts to
resolve at certification.' For example, a plaintiff might claim that the
defendant's fraudulent concealment of the wrong should toll the statute of limitations, and the relevant law might establish an objective
standard for determining when the plaintiff should have discovered
the injury and tolling should cease. In these cases, a district court's factual determination about when the plaintiff should have discovered
the injury will resolve the statute of limitations issue for many members of the class.'03
100 If discovery is necessary to resolve the issue, it should be considered factual. If discovery
is unnecessary, it should be considered legal. Individual statute of limitations issues do not sort
themselves into these convenient categories, however, because it is difficult to imagine a statute
of limitations question that would call for a separate legal determination for every class member.
Consequently, the district court should encounter three types of statute of limitations issues at
certification: shared, legal questions; shared, factual questions; and individual questions.
101 Consider Hilao v Estate of Marcos, 103 F3d 767 (9th Cir 1996), where the district court
determined that the statute of limitations for torture claims against former Philippine President
Marcos had been tolled during his tenure in office. The district court's determination was an interpretation of the Torture Victim Protection Act and affected all class members. Resolving the
statute of limitations question prior to certification allowed the court to avoid the implications of
a representative's time bar for Rule 23. Id at 772-73.
102 District courts will often look to evidence to determine the appropriateness of certification, although they should not base their decisions on the plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the
merits. See Caridad v Metro-North Commuter Railroad, 191 F3d 283, 292-93 (2d Cir 1999)
(looking to statistical evidence provided by the plaintiffs to determine their fitness as representatives in a class action based on disparate impact discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of
1964). See also Castano v American Tobacco Co, 84 F3d 734, 744 (5th Cir 1996) (referring to
Eisen and noting that "[a] district court certainly may look past the pleadings to determine
whether the requirements of rule 23 have been met"); Chateaude Ville Productions;Inc v TamsWitmark Music Library,Inc, 586 F2d 962,965-66 (2d Cir 1978) (remarking on the ability to conduct additional discovery of named representatives for the certification hearing); Wright, Miller,
and Kane, 7B FederalPracticeand Procedureat § 1785 (cited in note 12) ("Going beyond the
pleadings is necessary, as a court must understand the claims, defenses, relevant facts, and applicable substantive law in order to make a meaningful determination of the certification issues.").
103 See Great Rivers Cooperative v Farmland Industries; Inc, 120 F3d 893, 896-99 (8th Cir
1997) (affirming the district court's determination that all class members should have had notice
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Shared, factual issues might be more difficult than shared, legal
issues because they require partial discovery and might bear a greater
resemblance to an inquiry into the merits. Nonetheless, limited factual
inquiries may save the needless expense of full discovery.
District courts will also face more difficult, individual questions.
Individual statute of limitations issues might be more difficult to resolve at certification. For example, a district court will have difficulty
determining when each individual member of a class discovered her
injury."4
The categories shared factual, shared legal, and individual do not
provide a comprehensive taxonomy of statute of limitations issues.
These distinctions do, however, roughly capture a sense that district
courts have the capacity to resolve some statute of limitations issues
accurately very early in the litigation.
If a district court refuses to consider time bars to the named representative at certification, it should offer a compelling reason for
doing so.'4 Although district courts should not resolve every statute of
limitations issue at certification, simply identifying difficult questions
could facilitate management. For example, the question of whether a
defendant fraudulently concealed her tortious behavior might turn on
complex substantive issues that the district court wishes to reserve until after full discovery. Identifying the issues, however, will allow the
district court to make certain the class is composed of and represented
by parties who meet the statute of limitations with and without the
fraudulent concealment exception. This places all parties and the
court in a better position.
Allowing district courts to consider these issues at certification
should not increase the costs of erroneously denying certification. This
discretionary approach relies on modest assumptions about a district
court's decisionmaking abilities. Even if we do not have much confi-

of the wrong committed by the defendant).
104 See, for example, Commander Properties,164 FRD at 529, where the district court refused certification because determining when the class members discovered the harm would require individual findings of fact.
105Forcing the district court to enter findings on critical certification issues is not novel. The
Ninth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit have emphasized the importance of findings by a district
court when it refuses certification. See Gibson v Local 40 Supercargoesand Checkers, 543 F2d

1259,1263 & n 2 (9th Cir 1976) (refusing to defer to a trial court's certification decision given a
lack of findings); Ballardv Blue Shield ofSouthern West Virginia, Inc,543 F2d 1075,1080 (4th Cir
1976) (remanding because "[t]he district court ... did not explain, other than in the most general
terms, why the class did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 23"). Findings by the district court
also enable litigants to determine whether an appeal of the certification decision is warranted
and enable appellate courts to review the certification decision. See Wright, Miller, and Kane, 7B
FederalPracticeand Procedure§ 1785 at 119 & n 49 (cited in note 12). Forcing the district court
to enter findings when granting a motion for certification could clarify the defendant's issues on
appeal in the same manner.
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dence in the ability of district courts to resolve difficult cases prior to
certification, we should have confidence in their ability to identify difficult cases at this stage and bracket them for later resolution.'16 Simply
identifying the issues will aid the court in making management decisions.
2. Evaluating the time bar after certification risks wasting judicial
resources and prejudicing absent class members.
If district courts can dismiss improper classes earlier in the litigation rather than later, it will promote the efficiency goals of Rule 23.
As the litigation progresses beyond certification, notice fees and attorneys' fees increase.7 The extensive discovery process that typifies
complex class action litigation also consumes significant litigant and
judicial resources.'8 Rule 23 seeks to promote judicial and litigant
economy by allowing the consolidation of many individual actions
into a single, common proceeding."9 Dismissing a class action far into
the process will undermine this central purpose.
Recognizing this, many courts that fail to discover the named representative's time bar until late in the litigation refuse to dismiss the
class complaint. Instead, these courts allow another class member to
substitute and serve as the named representative. Substitution avoids
wasting resources, but has three serious limits.
First, in some cases, automatically relying on substitution may risk
binding absent class members to an unfair settlement. Certification
presents a major hurdle to most class actions, and settlement often
follows closely on the heels of certification."" A district court that fails
to consider statute of limitations issues at certification may inadver106 See Ruhrgas AG v Marathon Oil Co, 526 US 574, 119 S Ct 1563, 1571-72 (1999) (expressing confidence in the ability of the district court to distinguish between hard and easy cases
of personal and subject matter jurisdiction early in the litigation).
107 Notice fees are only required in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, but district courts have the
discretion to require the parties to issue notice in other class actions. Compare FRCP 23(b)(3)
with FRCP 23(d)(2). Several courts have noted the large expense of notice costs. See Eisen, 417
US at 167 (noting that individual notice could cost as much as $315,000). See also RD.Q. Inc of
Miami v Nissan Motor Corp in USA, 61 FRD 372,377 (S D Fla 1973) (describing notice costs of
over $300,000 and substantial discovery costs), affd, 577 F2d 910 (5th Cir 1978).
108 See Edward Brodsky, Discovery Abuses: A Shifting Target?,NY L J 3 (Apr 9, 1997) (indicating that discovery can account for 80 percent of total litigation costs).
109 The Advisory Committee Notes describe class actions as conserving judicial resources
and preventing redundancy. Advisory Committee's Notes to the 1966 Amendments in Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure259-64 (Foundation 1999). See also American Pipe & Construction Co v
Utah,414 US 538, 553-54 (1974) (describing the prevention of duplicative actions as the central
purpose of Rule 23).
110 Ortiz v FibreboardCorp, 527 US 815, 119 S Ct 2295, 2317-18 (1999) (describing enormous pressures for plaintiffs' counsel to settle large, complex class actions in the wake of certification). See also In re Rhone-PoulencRorer,Inc, 51 F3d 1293,1298-99 (7th Cir 1995) (describing
similar pressures on defendants).
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tently distribute settlement proceeds to time-barred class members.
Such inadvertent distributions will obviously either reduce the
amount awarded to class members with timely claims.. or impose a
disproportionate level of liability on the defendant. Although district
courts independently review settlement offers, the Supreme Court has
stated that this independent review is not sufficient to guard the interests of class members.' 2 A district court should investigate the named
representative's time bar as a factor critical to the fairness of certification. Identifying these issues early and deciding them correctly will reduce the risk of an unfair settlement.
Second, even if a case progresses to trial, certification could compromise the interests of absent class members. A representative's time
bar often coincides with difficult choice-of-law issues or ongoing
harms. In such cases, the representative's time bar may signal more
fundamental problems within the class that might compromise the due
process interests of absent class members. In such cases, certification
in the face of a representative's time bar might compromise Rule 23
requirements."'
Third, as explained in Part III.B, automatically allowing substitution will exaggerate current incentives for class attorneys to name few,
non-diverse representatives and exacerbate management problems.
This will frustrate district courts' efforts to manage class actions effectively and guarantee the procedural interests of defendants and absent
class members.
Considering statute of limitations issues at the certification stage
avoids the unpalatable alternatives of late dismissal of the class or late
substitution.
3. Preserving the purposes of statutes of limitations.
A time-barred class representative may not provide the defendant with sufficient notice of the number and types of potential claims.
After the Supreme Court's decision in American Pipe & Construction
Co v Utah, filing a class action tolls the statute of limitations for all
members of the putative class, even if the district court ultimately dell1
For example, in a limited fund class action, expanding the class of plaintiffs who can recover will necessarily reduce the amount recovered by each individual plaintiff. This may be
more generally true in any Rule 23(b)(3) class action where the defendant faces bankruptcy. See
Ortiz, 119 S Ct at 2311-12 (describing unique problems with limited fund class action and bankrupt defendants).
112 Ortiz, 119 S Ct at 2316 (1999) ("[A] fairness hearing under Rule 23(e) is no substitute
for rigorous adherence to those provisions of the Rule 'designed to protect absentees.");
Amchem Products Inc v Windsor, 521 US 591, 621-22 (1997) (emphasizing the importance of
preserving Rule 23(a) requirements despite the fairness hearing provided for in Rule 23(e)).
113
114

See Part II.C.
414 US 538 (1974).
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nies certification.'" The American Pipe tolling rule promotes the efficiency goals of Rule 23: if the statute of limitations continued to run

for putative class members after the filing of the action, putative class
members would need to file duplicative and wasteful individual actions to preserve their legal rights."6
The American Pipe tolling rule simultaneously preserves the traditional purposes of statutes of limitations. When a named representa-

tive commences a class action within the statutory period, she notifies
the defendants of the type of claim being brought and the approximate scope of those claims.'1 7 This notice prevents unfairness to the de-

fendant and gives the defendant an opportunity to preserve relevant
evidence.""I
The named representative's individual claim is crucial to defining

the scope of the class complaint and providing the defendant with accurate notice of the scope and type of the tolled liability."9 If the
named representative fails to satisfy the statute of limitations, then the

representative also fails to notify the defendant accurately of the
scope and type of her liability to class members with timely claims.'20

Months or even years after the filing of the initial complaint, the defendant may face a headless and mixed class, composed of individuals
with both timely and untimely claims.2 ' Certification despite the failure of the named representative to satisfy the statute of limitations
will undercut American Pipe'sdelicate balance between efficiency and

the purposes of statutes of limitations.n
115 Id at 552-53.

Id at 553.
Id at 554-55.
118 Id; Crown, Cork & Seal Co v Parker,462 US 345,352-53 (1983) (noting that the representative and class complaint should provide the defendant with fair notice of the type and scope
of liability).
119 See American Pipe, 414 US at 552-55 (1977) (emphasizing that the decision was restricted to cases where the class failed for lack of numerosity rather than the representative's
lack of adequacy or typicality).
120 See Davis v Bethlehem Steel Corp, 600 F Supp 1312,1318 (D Md 1985) ("[Tlhe claims of
the named representatives of the putative class ... must have been alleged sufficiently clearly to
establish the specific parameters ... of the class claims."). Charles Sawyer has suggested that
when the class claim and the named representative's individual claim differ substantially from
the claims of putative class members, then the class claim may fail to provide the defendant with
sufficient notice under American Pipe. Charles E Sawyer, Class Actions and Statutes of Limitations, 48 U Chi L Rev 106,114 (1981).
121 The Fourth Circuit recognized that dismissing the named plaintiffs would leave a
"headless lawsuit," but remanded the case to the district court to allow substitution, and ignored
any problems that might arise from American Pipe tolling. See Goodman v Schlesinger,584 F2d
1325,1332-33 (4th Cir 1978).
122 Substitution will not remedy the defect. The claims for all class members will be tolled
upon filing the class action. If the court allows the substitution of a class member whose claim
was not time-barred on the date of filing, the defendant will be caught off guard. Consider Haas
v PittsburghNationalBank, 526 F2d 1083,1097-98 (3d Cir 1975) (noting that when the court al116
117
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4. Using Rule 23 to assess the statute of limitations question
at certification.
Although a named representative's failure to satisfy the statute of
limitations seems to speak to the likelihood of her success on the
merits, making it inappropriate for consideration at the certification
stage, Eisen'2 permits the district court to inquire narrowly whether
the statute of limitations defense compromises Rule 23 requirements.
The named representative's time bar can be evaluated with reference
to Rule 23 requirements rather than the named representative's ultimate chances of success on the merits. Although the Supreme Court
refuses to allow district courts to reach conclusions about the ultimate
viability of representatives' claims, the Supreme Court has also repeatedly insisted that the named representative "be a part of the class
and 'possess the same interest and suffer the same injury' as the class
members."'2 A time-barred representative may suffer serious deficiencies as a representative or signal serious deficiencies in the class.'2
The district court certainly has the authority to inquire about the existence of defenses that might compromise the requirements of Rule
23.126

The discretionary nature of the statute of limitations inquiry
should eliminate concerns about reaching substantive conclusions
prematurely. Courts can always justify refusing to consider the statute
of limitations defense during certification because full discovery is
necessary to determine the validity of the defense. Courts could also
avoid preliminary conclusions about the statute of limitations if it
fears that such conclusions would unfairly prejudice the defendant.
For example, if a district court fears that determining whether the defendant fraudulently concealed her tortious conduct would "color the
subsequent proceedings and place an unfair burden on the defendant,"'2 then the court could balance that concern against the possibility of compromising notice to the defendant.m A mere justification
lows substitution for a named representative, American Pipe tolling will protect the claim of the

new named representative and all members of the class).
123 417 US 156 (1974). See text accompanying notes 46-49.
124 East Texas Motor FreightSystem, Inc v Rodriguez, 431 US 395,403 (1977), quoting Schlesinger v Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 US 208,216 (1974).
125 See Part II.
126 Courts often make detailed factual findings for the purposes of certification. These

courts routinely conduct discovery and go beyond the pleadings to determine whether classes
and representatives satisfy Rule 23 requirements such as predominance. See note 102. By contrast, in Eisen, the district court attempted to perform an operation not sanctioned by Rule 23,
namely, shifting notice costs from the plaintiffs to the defendants. Eisen, 417 US at 178.
127 Eisen,417 US at 178.

128 Part III.A.3 explains how allowing representation by a plaintiff who fails to satisfy the
statute of limitations may result in unfairness to the defendait.
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by the court, however, might have the benefit of identifying the poten-

tial statute of limitations issues."
B.

District Courts Should Adopt a Meaningful Presumption Towards
Dismissing the Class Complaint
If a district court decides the named representative is inappropri-

ate, it has several options. The district court can allow substitution or
intervention by another class member to remedy the defect and leave
the class unchanged, " divide the class into subclasses,3 ' limit the size
of the existing class,L2 or strike the class and allow the action to continue individually.3 3 A district court theoretically has the discretion to

revoke certification and dismiss the class action throughout the trial. m
In practice, however, the class assumes an independent status after
certification, and the district court is much less likely to dismiss9'
Courts that find the named representative inappropriate becauise her
claim is time-barred typically allow substitution or intervention to
remedy the named representative's defects.36 These courts, however,
See note 105.
Sheriff of Cook County, 167 F3d 1155,1158 (7th Cir 1999) (arguing that district courts should simply allow substitution when events subsequent to certification reveal the
inappropriateness of the named representative).
131 In re Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co, 725 F2d 858, 861 (2d Cir 1984) (creating subclasses to resolve difficult choice of law problems).
132 Shvartsman v Apfel, 138 F3d 1196,1201 (7th Cir 1998) (upholding a district court's decision to limit the class to all resident aliens receiving food stamps who lived in the Seventh Circuit
rather than allowing the action to continue as a nationwide class action); Wright, Miller, and
Kane, 7A FederalPracticeand Procedure§ 1760 at 127-28 (cited in note 12) (noting the court's
discretion to limit or redefine the class).
133 Hardy v City OpticalInc,39 F3d 765,772 (7th Cir 1994) (affirming the denial of certification and allowing the suit to continue individually); Wright, Miller, and Kane, 7A Federal
Practiceand Procedure § 1760 at 131 (cited in note 12) (noting the court's option to strike the
class and allow plaintiffs to proceed individually).
134 See note 28.
135 For example, the district court will often allow an action to proceed if the named representative's claim becomes moot after certification but will require intervention or substitution if
the named representative's claim becomes moot prior to certification. Comer v Cisneros,37 F3d
775,798 (2d Cir 1994) (noting that an individual named plaintiff can continue to represent the interest of the class after certification, even if the plaintiff's individual stake has disappeared).
Courts will also ignore the post-trial inadequacy of a named plaintiff Falcon, 457 US at 156
(noting that the case would be different if the named plaintiffs appeared inadequate after certification); Thurston v Dekle, 531 F2d 1264,1270 (5th Cir 1976) (upholding class certification when
named plaintiff's failure to satisfy standing requirement was caused by legal interpretation subsequent to his suit, and the new law was unknown both to plaintiff and to trial court), vacated on
other grounds, 438 US 901 (1978).
136 InternationalWoodworkers of America v Chesapeake Bay Plywood Corp, 659 F2d 1259,
1270 (4th Cir 1981) (reversing the district court's denial of certification to allow substitution by
class members whose claims were not time-barred); Goodman v Schlesinger,584 F2d 1325,133233 (4th Cir 1978) (remanding to allow substitution after named plaintiffs were dismissed because
the evidence failed to show that they suffered any discrimination); Cox v Babcock and Wilcox
Co, 471 F2d 13,16 (4th Cir 1972) (affirming the lack of an individual claim but remanding to al129

130 Robinson v
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usually make this decision without thoroughly examining the incentive effects created by allowing substitution or intervention.ln The district court's decision to allow substitution or intervention should consider the notice and fairness concerns mentioned in Part III.A in the
context of the incentives created for plaintiffs' attorneys!ln
1. Incentives currently faced by the class attorney.
If a district court simply allows substitution, it will preserve incentives for plaintiffs' attorneys to name few representatives while simultaneously defining classes vaguely and broadly. The current system
encourages plaintiffs' attorneys to name fewer representatives in two
ways. First, plaintiffs' attorneys have strong incentives to bring suits
quickly, without investing significant resources. Plaintiffs' attorneys
are generally members of small firms with very few resources.'39 Initially underinvesting in a large number of actions may be the best way
for a class attorney to diversify risk. Reducing the amount invested in
any given case allows the class attorney to spread risk among a large
number of cases: this prevents a single bad outcome from destroying
the attorney's entire practice.'" Consequently, the plaintiffs' attorney

low a new class member to step forward).
137 See, for example, Peoples v Wendover Funding,Inc, 179 FRD 492,499-502 (D Md 1998)
(dismissing a time-barred representative without creating subclasses or dealing with the more
complex and subtle issues). See also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of EntrepreneurialLitigation: BalancingFairnessand Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U Chi L Rev 877, 877
(1987) ("[Clivil procedure scholars ... have as a group been reluctant to engage explicitly in incentive-based reasoning.").
138 An initial reservation: Complex incentives and difficult empirical questions might limit
our ability to gauge the dynamic effects of any procedural change confidently. However, the difficulty of this task should not excuse courts and commentators from evaluating this critical variable. Instead, the uncertainty argues in favor of a minimalist approach. Uncertainty should make
us skeptical of attempts to reshape class action law radically. Consider Ortiz v FibreboardCorp,
527 US 815, 119 S Ct 2295, 2320-21 (1999) (chastising lower courts for liberally experimenting
with the text of Rule 23). When addressing these issues, we should act incrementally. A minimalist approach by individual district courts might enable us to learn more about the complex effects of procedural changes and presumptions on the incentives of class attorneys. At the same
time, a minimalist approach will avoid creating large unintended negative consequences. Consider Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court 52-53
(Harvard 1999) (advocating "shallow and narrow decisions" to counteract the difficulties posed
by cognitive limitations); Dietrich D6rner, The Logic ofFailure:Recognizing and Avoiding Error
in Complex Situations 1-10 (Addison-Wesley 1997) (Rita and Robert Kimber, trans) (discussing
the difficulties even the most educated and professional people have in anticipating bad consequences of social engineering). With that in mind, we might make some cautious statements
about the possible incentive effects of allowing automatic substitution or intervention when the
named representative fails to satisfy the statute of limitations.
139 John C. Coffee, Jr., Understandingthe PlaintiffsAttorney: The Implicationsof Economic
Theory for PrivateEnforcement of Law through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum L Rev
669,704-12 (1986) (discussing the incentives for plaintiff's firms to engage in "portfolio diversification" due to their small sizes and status as repeat players).
140

See id.
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might minimize search costs by naming fewer representatives and
minimize research costs by defining the class broadly and vaguely.
Second, naming a larger number of representatives risks shifting decithe plaintiffs' attorney into the hands of the
sionmaking power • from
141
class representatives.
The current system also encourages plaintiffs' attorneys to define
classes broadly and vaguely. Defining the class too broadly places burdens on the defendant, the court, and absent class members rather
than the plaintiffs' attorney; defining the class too narrowly deprives
the plaintiffs' attorney of a portion of the potential recovery. The
larger the class, the greater the potential recovery and attorneys'
fees."2 In addition, American Pipe tolling encourages the class attorney
to define the class broadly. When a complaint names a broader class,
14
the statute of limitations will be tolled for a larger number of people.
These combined incentives can create an inefficient dynamic:
plaintiffs' attorneys will systematically create large, unwieldy classes
without naming diverse representatives. Unfortunately, the plaintiffs'
attorney, rather than the court, is in a better position to divine potential conflicts among the class, differences in the class, and effective
management devices.
2. Information-eliciting penalty defaults.
District courts should adopt a meaningful presumption towards
dismissing a class when all of the named representatives fail to satisfy
the statute of limitations. This presumption would punish individual
plaintiffs' attorneys who brought class actions naming only timebarred representatives. It would establish incentives for plaintiffs' attorneys to consider statute of limitations issues more carefully and
name multiple, diverse representatives.
Dismissing these complaints would impose two costs on plaintiffs'
attorneys who file class actions naming time-barred representatives.
First, plaintiffs' attorneys who file a class action and lose the certifica-

141

See Macey and Miller, 58 U Chi L Rev at 41 (cited in note 21) (suggesting plaintiffs' at-

torneys select named representatives who will allow the attorney to control the course of litigation).
142 Ortiz, 119 S Ct at 2317-18 (recognizing that the prospect of a large recovery and enormous fees may influence the behavior of the plaintiffs' attorney). Some courts have replaced the
percentage of recovery scheme with a lodestar scheme that awards plaintiff's attorneys the time
reasonably spent on a matter, but incentives remain to define a class broadly. Coffee, 54 U Chi L
Rev at 888-89 (cited in note 137) (describing the lodestar system). An attorney can justify higher
levels of staffing and spending more time on a matter if the class is larger.
143 Haas v PittsburghNationalBank, 526 F2d 1083,1097-98 (3d Cir 1975) (noting that when
the court allows substitution for a named representative, American Pipe tolling will protect the

claim of the new named representative and all members of the class).
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tion hearing risk reducing the size of their class fee." The market for
class actions is extremely robust," and plaintiffs' attorneys have few
resources to dedicate to uncovering potential class actions."' Plaintiffs'
attorneys lower search costs by relying heavily on the news media and
filings by other attorneys to uncover profitable class actions. Filing the
class action signals the availability of a profitable class action to other
attorneys; these attorneys will race to find representatives and file
suit.'0 If the plaintiffs' attorney loses the certification hearing, then it
gives competing attorneys additional time to find representatives and
attempt to share in the class fee.
Second, each additional certification hearing costs plaintiffs' attorneys. A second certification hearing will require additional legal research, discovery, and search costs.'0 This presumption may reduce the
absolute number of class claims filed, but it should not substantially
reduce the number of meritorious claims filed. Many plaintiffs' attorneys fiercely compete to litigate a limited number of profitable class
actions.49 At first cut, this minimal cost should not substantially reduce
the number of class attorneys or the number of class suits filed.
Even if the presumption lowers the absolute number of class actions filed, it should shift more resources to meritorious claims. Raising standards for certification will force the plaintiffs' attorney to direct resources prior to certification more carefully. Carefully organizing frivolous claims constitutes an unnecessary cost. If the plaintiffs'
attorney has a meritorious class claim, however, the expected value of
the case is higher, and the district court's certification denial will draw
fierce competition from other attorneys. When district courts reject
hastily organized meritorious claims, the plaintiffs' attorney will lose a
larger share of the class fee to competitors. The marketplace will reward plaintiffs' attorneys for accurately sorting meritorious and
144 John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithfil Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder
Litigation,48 L & Contemp Probs 5,50 (Summer 1985) (noting that when multiple plaintiffs' attorneys appear to represent the class, the plaintiffs' attorneys must divide the contingency and
their individual shares decline).
145 Id (describing the competitiveness of the market for antitrust and securities class actions).
146 Coffee, 86 Colum L Rev at 704-12 (cited in note 139) (noting the small size of most
plaintiffs' firms).
147 Id at 681-82 (describing most entrepreneurial litigation as sparked by a high-visibility
event that makes the news or the initiation of suit by another party). In the securities arena, class

actions often follow Securities and Exchange Commission proceedings or a bankruptcy. See John
E. Kennedy, Securities Class and Derivative Actions in the United States District Court for the
NorthernDistrictof Texas:An EmpiricalStudy, 14 Houston L Rev 769,824 (1977) (reporting that
50 percent of class and derivative actions piggybacked on prior proceedings).
148 Macey and Miller, 58 U Chi L Rev at 66 (cited in note 21) (identifying costs associated
with finding each additional named representative and proving she meets the requirements of
Rule 23(a) and labeling them deadweight losses).
149 Coffee, 48 L & Contemp Probs at 50 (cited in note 144).
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frivolous claims earlier, and it will reward early investments in merito-

rious class claims.
Encouraging more careful organization of class actions and
naming multiple, diverse representatives will have several important
advantages. First, the plaintiff's attorney has more information about
the composition of the class and the facts that gave rise to the suit.
Early in the action, the district court has few opportunities to conduct
extensive fact finding.m If a district court can force the plaintiffs' attorney to disclose most of the relevant information, then the court can
make more informed management decisions early in the litigation.
Second, this presumption facilitates the notice requirements of
American Pipe. A larger and more diverse set of named representatives will give the defendant better notice of the potential number and
type of claims encompassed by the putative class.'
Third, this presumption forces a clarification of the class itself. A
more diverse set of named representatives will make conflicts more
readily apparent and facilitate the early development of subclasses.
Even harsh critics of the current adequacy and typicality requirements
admit that the named representative provides the district court with
information about the internal composition of the class. A larger and
more diverse set of named representatives will reveal internal class
conflicts earlier and allow the district court to manage the case more
effectively.
CONCLUSION

Timing matters. All courts agree that a time-barred representative fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23. Refusing to allow districts court to consider easy statute of limitations issues at certification
forces the court to choose later between wasting substantial resources
or prejudicing absent class members. Furthermore, if the named representative is later dismissed, then the initial class complaint does not
provide the defendant with notice of the scope and type of her liability within the statutory period. A carefully limited inquiry into the
named representative's time bar could avoid reaching substantive
conclusions about the representative's chances of success on the merits. At certification, district courts should narrowly investigate whether

150 For a description of the limited information available to the trial court, see Macey and
Miller, 58 U Chi L Rev at 46 (cited in note 21).
151

See Part I.A.3.

152

Macey and Miller, 58 U Chi L Rev at 76 (cited in note 21) ("The divergence in interests

between the named plaintiff and other class members is rather a function of a more fundamental
problem, namely the divergence in interests among members of the class.").
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a time bar to the named representative's action will compromise Rule
23 requirements.
If district courts routinely consider the matter at certification,
then they will often face the question of what to do with a headless
class. Rather than ordering remedial steps, these courts should strike
the class action. By striking the class complaint when the named representative fails to satisfy the statute of limitations, district courts can
encourage plaintiffs' attorneys to name multiple and diverse representatives, facilitating more effective management of the class action.

